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Russia; (4) during the Spring 2012, the protestors showed its flexibility in 
using  various forms of  action repertoire: pickets, meetings, permanent and 
mobile camps, walks along the city’s boulevards with prominent writers, 
artists, painters as well as the counter-claims and litigations. All in all, in this 
period the protest actions embraced more than 30 cities. It is indicative that 
protest organisers in order to avoid clashes with the police used to practice 
carnival form of collective action open to all who wish to join it; (5) but this 
carnivalisation does not mean the decline of self-organisation. On the con-
trary, the new forms of self-organisation mushroomed. Each initiative group 
of the movement developed a particular form of activity ranging from the 
project the ‘Observer’ (of the electoral procedures of the past and forthcom-
ing elections) to protestor’s camps with disputes and lectures and full ser-
vices including voluntary guards. The further the more an internet is used as 
a universal tool (for communication, fundraising, learning by doing, etc.); 
and (6) finally, the leadership of the movement is still an open question. On 
the one hand, the leaders of its radical wing who were sentenced many times 
have authority over a good deal of protestors. On the other hand, the young 
middle-class protestors move forth the leaders from their ranks. They incline 
to support the public figures which offer the concrete, mainly short-term, 
goals and programmes. 
 
9. Conclusion 
The very fact that for the first time after democratic upsurge (ie after 
perestroika) Russia was encumbered with mass protest meetings is rather 
indicative because it has already a set of political consequences. First, it 
means not only that Russian society is politically awakened, but that its con-
fidence in the current political system has been exhausted. It became clear 
that substantial changes in existing political system are at stake.    
Second, the protest mobilization revealed that contemporary Russian 
society is split into numerous antagonistic groups: the centre vs. the prov-
inces; the ‘new middle-class’, a challenger of changes, vs. the adherents of 
stability; the TV-people vs. the Internet-people; the internationalists vs. the 
patriots; the radical patriots vs. the responsible nationalists. It means that 
mobilization has revealed the true disposition of social forces. 
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Thirdly, a new type of oppositional social movement – network-
based – is being rapidly formed nationwide. This movement won a place on 
the political arena. More than that, it institutionalized in the form of new le-
gal political parties; it engendered various forms of civic control over the 
electoral processes at all levels; and initiated the establishment of groups of 
the same control by the internet civic observers. Finally, the protest mobili-
zation and its aftereffects forced the power elite to embark on the way of dia-
logue with opposition. 
Fourthly, while the opposite part having the mighty financial and 
administrative resources at hand it nevertheless was forced to change its po-
sition from ‘full rejection’ to ‘preemption’ and to even the dialog and com-
promises with its adversaries. But to such a dialog when a steering wheel is 
kept in the hands of power elite. 
Anyhow, the burden of the past keeps weighing upon the situation. 
The government is stepping up pressure on the opposition forces, while the 
changes in the political system it offers are not of a strategic character. As to 
the ‘new middle-class’, it is too small and politically immature to initiate 
serious political changes. It is indicative that the mass protest movement un-
der consideration is not homogeneous and linear in character; there is no 
proportionality between its causes and its strength as well. This movement 
has a variety of goals and is heterogeneous as to the social and political forc-
es involved, who act together in a short run only. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant that the set of protest waves had united internet-based ‘centre of 
command’. 
What will be happening in the foreseeable future? The opinions of 
Russian analysts differ. Some hold that we shall see ‘retreat and restoration’ 
and ‘tightening of the screws’. Others think that the government will get 
weaker in the next six years, will make some concessions and try to appease 
the people in the habitual way: first give money to the one side, then to the 
other, and so on. Still others believe that Russia is back in February 1917 
politically. All analysts agree that the government will try to fragmentise the 
opposition, while some are sure that the opposition has already divided. In 
my view, a new wave of mass political protest can be provoked only by 
sharp destabilization of the geopolitical situation (landslide of oil prices, in-
ternational sanctions) or the belt-tightening policy, which would hit the 
masses of socially vulnerable population. Then it would be not a protest but 
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rather something akin to a ‘Russian revolt’ [16]. There is a probability of the 
first, and the second, and the third. However, as Russian social historians 
suggested a good while ago, in the longer term of a few decades we shall 
more probably be observing a specifically Russian ‘cycle’, that is, alternate 
motion: a modernization breakthrough – a slow and painful retreat – a new 
head start (Akhiezer, 2006). But such is a picture seen in historical perspec-
tive. As to the people, they ‘have to make existential choice actually every 
single day. They have to survive overcoming apathy – the reaction of the 
collective unconscious to the terrible 20th century,… to go on living and not 
degrading but becoming more sophisticated – that is how the task for the 
Russian intellectual stands today’ (Mirzoev, 2011: 20). 
 
Notes 
1. Most probably, this will not last long. That is why the ideology of 
Eurasian community has been called into play once again by the power elite, 
this time with a definite purpose: to recreate the core of the former Soviet 
Union. ‘In the last months <of 2011 – O.Ya.> Russia, Belarus and Kazakh-
stan achieved considerable progress in the matter of cooperation by signing a 
declaration on Eurasian economic integration’ (Zhiltsov, 2011: 11).  
2. In accordance with some unofficial calculations, there are about 
60 thousand small settlements without population at all.  
3. In this way, large cities confirmed once again their role of politi-
cal and social centres even in the presence of a network community. 
4. During one year the protest environmental movement ‘Save 
Khimky Wood’ in a Moscow suburb turned from a one-point drive for pre-
serving an oak grove into a symbol of movement against the destruction of 
Russian living environment. A. Chirikova, leader of the drive, became one of 
the leaders of the all-Russia movement ‘For Fair Elections’ in December 
2011. One more example: A small volunteer group led by Doctor Liza who 
helped victims of forest and peat fires in 2010 turned into an international 
public charity organization ‘Fair Aid’ in 2011 (http: //doctorliza.ru).  
